I. Introduction
It is often argued that prices are sticky in the United States. In particular, various empirical papers have claimed to pi-ovide evidence that supports this view. However, these empii-ical papers have suffered fi-om one major common Haw. None of them estimated equations that represented a formal theory. Therefore theii-I-esults are very hai-d to interpret.' In general these studies have assumed that prices acl~ust at a constant rate to theii-desired value. T h e desired value Ivas then assumed to depend on both the cui-rent and lagged values of a variety of variables (unit labor costs, the level of capacity utilization, the rental price of capital, the level of output, and the level of capital are but examples of these vai-iahles). T h e n these authors estimated equations that made current prices a function of lagged pi-ices and the variables purported to influence the desired prices. T h e E~c t that in the United States lagged prices help to explain current prices Ivas taken by these authors as evidence that prices are sticky. T h e papers by d e Rfenil (1974) and Eckstein and Fi-omrn (1968) , :is ~vell as the MPS rnodel as reported by d e Menil and Enzler ( 1972) , Hymans (1972) , and McCallurn (1979) , proceed exactly as outlined above. Eckstein and il'yss (1972) , u.ho concentrate on indi~i d u a l prices, also make the desired pi-ices a function of a variety o f vai-iables and, instead of allotving lagged prices to explain cui-i-ent prices, they estimate their price equations by correcting for first-ordeiserial cor~.elation. It is hard to interpret this procedure, but it also could 'Ippeai-consistent with some form of price rigiditv.
Of course, just the fact that lags of the variables relevant in explaining "desired" prices are significant explanators of current prices seems to point tolvard the existence of some sort of rigidity. 'This view is not shared by Sahling (1977) . H e explains cui-i-ent prices by current and lagged values of various variables. He does not include lagged prices in his list of explanators of current pi-ices. Instead, he appears to think that pi-ices are flexible if the current and lagged rates of return on capital d o not help in predicting current prices. H e vie~vs pi-ices as relatively inflexible if neither the stocks of labor noi-those of capital help explain prices. He concludes that the data support the hypothesis that prices are relatively rigid. Dornherger (1979) goes one step further. H e computes the "speed of adjustment" of prices to~vard his measure of "desired" prices for a variety of industries. H e then runs a regression of the speeds of adjustment of these industries on some indicators of industry structure. Again, even though the results seem plausible, they are hard to interpret in the absence of a theory.
Many of these authors state that pi-ices are sticky hecause firms face costs of changing their prices. 'These costs range from the objective costs of printing new price lists to the costs borne hy firms as they rendei-their customers unhappy with recurrent price changes. If one couples the assumption that firms face costs of changing prices with assumptions about functional forms, one can estimate the parameters of the implied stochastic processes as ~vell as test the implications of these assumptions. Moreover, this leads to parameters u.hose interpretation is straightforward. 'The purpose of this paper is to estimate and test a model in ~vhich firms face costs of changing pi-ices.
I start in Section I1 hy presenting the rnodel and computing the equilibr.ium of a n economy in ~vhich firms uith market polver face c1uadratic price adjustment costs. T h e implications of this equilibrium for the stochastic processes governing the joint behavior of the aggregate variables (the pi-ice level, the level of output, and the money stock) are presented in Section 111. Section IV estimates the model in t\vo versions. First, it is assumed that all the prices in the United States ai-e set by pi-ice-setting firms ~v h o face costs to changing prices. 'Then . . t 1s assumed that only those fii-ms whose output belongs to the nonfarm business sector have these charactei-istics. T h e other prices are grouped in a n index which is taken to be econometrically exogenous. 'The estimates are compared ~v i t h the predictions of the model. In general, the estimates are consistent with the model. I n particular, prices are sho\vn to he sticky in the United States.
T h e n , the estimated equations are compared ~vith less restricted equations to ascertain ~\.hether the U.S. data I-eject the model. These more general specifications do not I-eject the equations describing money and prices. They do, howe\~er, reject the specification of the output ecluation. This may be d u e to the neglect of the effect of relative prices on aggregate output. Section V presents some conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Model
T h e model considered here and its implications foi-business cycles are presented in moi-e detail in Rotemherg (1981, in press ). 'The economy consists of 12 monopolists indexed hy i whose demand functions at time t are: ~v h e r e Qit is the quantity of good i demanded at time t , Pit is the price of good i at t , MI is the level of money balances at t , and V t is the \~~l~i e at t of a time-vai-ying taste parameter. 'The terms A,, hi, and d are constants, and P, is the price level at t which is given by:
In equation ( I ) , higher real money balances lead to a lai-gel-demand foi-all goods. This is a natui-a1 consequence of assuming that individuals derive utility from theii-holdings of real money balances.
T h e cost to fii-~n i of producing Qi, is assumed to he given by:
~v h e r e C,,is a time-varying parameter. In pni-ticulnr, U,tcould depend on the I-eal mage at t , as in Roternherg (1981, in press ). T h e implications foi-the movements of relative prices, aggregate output, and the price level ai-e the same ~vhether a classical labor market is included in the model o r not. 'Thei-efore, foi-simplicity, this paper tvill proceed as if only goods Ivere required to produce goods in the United States. Note that the cost functions (3) ai-e such that the economy's production possibilities ai-e bounded.
In the absence of costs of changing prices, firm i ~vould charge a price P: such that the marginal revenue fi-om sales is equal to the mai-ginal cost of production. 'This price is given by:
In the expressions above, lowercase letters represent the logarithms of the i-espective uppercase letters and Oi is the logarithm of the elasticity of demand over the elasticity of demand tninus one a n d is therefoi-e constant.
T h e key feature of this model is that price changes are assumed to be costly. T h e presence of these costs has been hypothesized hy vai-ious authors, including Bar-ro (1972) , Noi-dhaus (1972) , Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), and Rlussa (1981) . 'These costs ai-e of tu.o types. First, there is a fixed cost per pi-ice change which includes the physical cost of changing posted prices. Second, and in my view more important, there is a cost that captui-es the negative effect of price changes, particularly price increases on the reputation of firms. As stated in Stiglitz (1979) , under imperfect information customers ~vill tend to cater to fii-~ns ~vith relatively stable price paths and avoid those firms which change theii-prices often and by lai-ge anlounts. 'The reputation of firms is presumably more affected by large price changes, t\.hich ai-e very noticeable, than by small price changes. Therefore the costs of price acljust~nents ai-e assumed to be quadi-atic in the percentage change of prices.
T h e firms are now assumed to maximize the expected discounted value of the difference het~veen revenues from sales a n d the sum of pi-oduction costs and costs of changing prices. As shown in R o t e~n -berg (in press), this expected discounted value can he approximated by:
lvhei-e I.:, denotes the operatoi-that takes expectations conditional o n information a~ailable at time t and n(pz)is the difference between the I-evenues and the costs of production that t\.ould acci-ue to the firm if it charged P:. 'The constant k i is the second term of the 'Taylor expansion of profits ai-ound p:, while p is the discount factor and c i is a parametei-. At p:, the derivative of pi-ofits with respect to prices is zero, and thei-efore the linear term is excluded from ( 5 ) .
hlaximizing expression ( 5 ) is equivalent to minimizing:
Note that the expectations at t of p:, the price the fii-m ~vould charge in the absence of costs to changing prices, are independent of the firm's actions.
I now assume that, foi-all i , c i / k , = c. This assurnption imposes one nonlinear restriction across the four firms' specific parameters. 'This assumption is sufficient to ensure that all firms adjust their-prices at the same speed. It is trivially satisfied ~v h e n h,, c,, A i , and u,are identical across firms.
T h e minimization of ( 6 ) is a recursive optimal control pi-oblem2 u.hich leads to the follo~\.ing path for the prices that firm i expects to charge:
T h e supersci-ipt i denotes an expectation made by firm i. l'he quantity pi,,,, is the expectation held at t by fii-m i of the logarithm of'the price level at t + j, u.hile pi,,,+,is the logai-ithm of the pi-ice that firm i expects to charge at t + j. 'The behavioral constants cu and / 3 obey the follolving equations:
At t , firms actually change the leading element of the sequence given by ( 7 , namely, p, , , , . In general, ( 7 ) can be interpreted as saying that, 'PI-oblems of this type ha\e been solved by numet-ous authors including Keunan l~ecause price changes are costly, the firms ~vill move their pi-ices slolvly from their pi-evious pi-ice to the expected pFs.
T h e rational expectations equilibrium of this economy can now be computed. It requires that the firms know at t the mathematical expectation of the future values of the exogenous vai-iahles m , u , and s.
Xt time t the firms have a n expectation of the pi-ices they ~vill charge in the future. These are the prices the firms ~vould actually charge in the future if they did not revise their expectations of p , m , u , and .F.
'These expected future prices can be condensed to form the mathematical expectation of the futui-e price levels. T h e assumption of rationality of expectations ensures that this mathernatical expectation is equal to the future pi-ice levels expected by firms.
As sholvn in Roternberg (1981, in press ), this rational expectations equilihi-iurn can be described by the follo~ving equation:
and m,lr+k, 7 1 t l r + k , and S,lr+h-ai-e the mathematical expectations of m,+k,
and St+k conditional on information available at t . Equation (1 1) describes the path of the pi-ice levels expected at t . T h e actual price levels are given by the s e q u e n~e p ,~, .
It turns out that [m, -is the price level that ~vould prevail at t in the absence of costs of changing pi-ices. Thei-efoi-e, ( 1 1) can be interpreted as saying that prices adjust gradually toward their expected target.
I define a n index of aggregate output Y,:"
Recalling that in this equilibriu~n model output is always equal to output demanded, I \\-ill approximate Zl(P,,IP,)'p"~L4i by a constant independent of time. T h a t is, I approximate a ~veighted sum of all relative pi-ices by a constant. This ~vill be valid as long as relative pi-ices d o not fluctuate too ~videly. 'This approximation makes the index of aggregate output independent of relative prices. T h e n
( 1 6 ) ~vhel-e j'
Note that abi-upt changes in the quan-= log X , i l , ( P i , i P , ) l p~. tity of money u.ill lead to only gradual changes in the pi-ice level a n d , therefore, to changes in output by ( 1 6 ) .
Testable Implications for the Paths of Aggregate Variables
I ~vill present t~v o testable implications of the model. First, the model is consistent only with cei-tain paths foi-the price level and output ~v h e n money is assumed to follo~v a univariate autoi-egressive process. Second, it permits only certain paths for the pi-ice level and output ~v h e n the prices of food and energy ai-e assumed to be econometrically exogenous, while the othei-s are set by firms ~vhose loss function is given by ( 5 ) .
I h r Path of Outpzct und the P I Z C~ Leuel When 1Z101zej I\ Erogerzol~~
T h e model of this paper can be estimated and tested as long as assumptions ai-e made about the paths of m and v . I n this section, I ill iissume that the ,si are fixed, while m and v follow univariate auto reg^-essive processes of low order. 'The firms u.ill be assumed to know these processes and base their pricing decisions on them.
.I'he money stock ~vill be assumed to follow the follo~ving process:
T h e roots of T ( z ) = 0 ai-e assumed to be greater than p in ahsolute value. T h e 5, are independent normal variates ~vith mean zero and variance at.In othei-u.oi-ds, it is assumed that money is exogenous and that no other economic variables "cause" m in the Granger sense. It turns out that money seems to be exogenous ill this sense in the United States as demonstrated hy Sims ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,Feige and Pearce ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,and also by me in Section IV of this paper. T h e taste foi-money balances u,ill be assurned to follo~v a first-oi-dei-stochastic difference equation:
~v h e r eA is smaller than l i p , while the v,'s are independent normal val-iates \vith mean zero and variance cr$. Sargent ( 1 9 7 6 6 ) has noted that when money follolvs a pi-ocess like ( 1 7 ) ,it is impossihle to distinguish models in ~vhich output depends on the levels of m and models in ~\.hich output depends on the histoi-y of the unpi-edictable components of m. T h e model of pi-ice stickiness considel-ed here certainly imposes restrictions on the vector stochastic process of p , q , and m. It is conceivable that other simple dynamic general equilibrium models impose similar restrictions. Until such other ~nodels are made explicit, ho~vever, acceptance on statistical grounds of these restrictions can he viewed as providing some support for the model of this paper.
Befoi-e these tests can be carried out, the price equation that depends on the expected le\~els of future money balances must be transformed so as to depend on only observables. After all, the firms make their pr-edictions of futur-e money balances using information on current and past levels of money balances by applying ( 1 7 ) .
T h e problem is to make C~=,(l/S)jm,,,+j depend on only current and past levels of money balances. This pr-oblem has been solved in a pathbreaking paper by Hansen and Sargent ( 1 9 8 0 ) .They proved that Similarl). it is eask to show that which converges as long as h/S < 1, A < 6 = l l p y . Hence it converges if h < lip. Therefore, the price level at t is given by where ( 1 4 ) was used to eliminate Dipc. Equation ( 2 1 )can be estimated along with (17),the autoregressive ( A R ) process for m. These two equations ar-e not independent since the Ti's appear in both. Equation ( 2 1 )is a "structural" equation both in that it involves endogenous variables o n the right-hand side and in that it has a direct behavioral interpretation. However, in contrast to the usual "structural" equations of macroeconometi-ics, it does not correspond to one sector's behavior in one market. Instead, it is a property of an equilibrium which takes into account the behavior-of n firms and many more consumers. In particular-, it embodies assumptions about the demand functions of individuals, the cost functions of firms, and the behavior of firms.
T h e coefficients y and 6 are identified. Unfortunately, one cannot reconstruct D , c , and p from knowledge of these coefficients. Instead, only Dlc and p can be recovered by use of (12)and (13) .I h e behavior of the aggregate variables is unaffected by a doubling of c and D. As far as the price level is concerned, it is not the variable c which captures the relative pressures on charging the "right" price and on not changing prices. Instead, it is the variable Dlc that represents these relative pressures. ' 4 large value for Dlc means both that there is a large effect on demand when the price level is slightly wrong and that it is relatively inexpensive to change prices. Therefore, a large Dlc leads to relatively fast adjustnlent (i.e., low values for y and high values for 6).
Note that the coefficients y and 6 ar-e independent of the monetary rule *(I>). Therefore, the estimates of y and 6 are immune to the Lucas (1976)criticism and can be used to simulate the private sector's response to various monetary rules. T h e variable zl, clearly constitutes an error term of (21 ) from the view of an econometrician since it is not observable. This, of course, does not make it difficult to estimate the parameter A since (21)can be transformed by the usual Koyck transformation. If ut is the only variable which make5 it impossible to estimate deterministic price and output equations, then the error in the price equation ought to be proportional to the error-in the output equation (16) .At least the errors of both the output equation and the price equation ought to follow the same first-order autor-egressive process (37).
T h e model of (16), ( l 7 ) , and ( 2 1 ) restricts the coefficients of the output, money forecasting, and pricing equations. 7'0 test whether these restrictions are rejected by the data, one can compare the fit of the model estimated with the restrictions to the fit of less constrained models.
As shown, for instance, in Mrilson (1973) , the hypothesis that r restrictions are true is acceptable for low values of the statistic, T(1, -I,), where T is the number of observations, 1, is the logarithm of the determinant of the empirical covariance matrix of the errors when the estimation is carried out without the restrictions, and I , is the corresponding quantity when the estimation is carried out imposing the restrictions. In particular, under the null hypothesis that the restrictions are true, the quantity T(1, -1,) is distributed x 2 ( r ) , where r is the number of restrictions.
The Path of the P~z c e Lez~el When Certnzn Price, Are Exogenou,
In the analysis above, all the prices in the economy were assumed to 11e set by firms with market power who perceived price changes to be costly. However, in the United States not all prices are set by firms to ~v h o m these properties can be attributed. Instead, the model above seems best suited to explain the prices charged by the nonfarm business sector.
T h e dollar prices of agricultural goods are probably the prices that clear a competitive wor-ld market. Even those agricultural goods which are not traded inter-nationally (like lettuce) are produced by competitive firms, to whom it is hard to attribute a pricing rule like ( 6 ) . T h e prices of government services are set with consideration other than profit maximization. Meanwhile the prices of the internationally traded goods are also mostly set in wor-ld markets. In this section it will be assumed that the prices of the goods that enter the U.S. GDP, but are not produced by the business nonfarm sector-, can be grouped in an index whose logarithm is p,,. This index will be assumed to be econometrically exogenous in the sense of Sims (1972) . That is, it will be assumed that this index can best be explained by a univariate time-series process. In particular, this index will not be allowed to respond to the history of monetary innovations or even to the prices of the business nonfarm sector. I h i s assumption of econometric exogeneity is tested below and is not rejected by U.S. data.
T h e price level in this case is a convex combination of'p,,,and ofp,, the average price charged by the onfa farm business sector: ,/Zy=,, h , . Using the technique which led to (1 l ) , we can write the d)namics of p as: Therefore, Hence the private nonfarm business price index does not just depend on the future money stocks but also on the future exogenous component of the price level. T h e set of exogenous prices is a determinant of the long-run equilibrium private business price index for two reasons. Fir-st, the composite good whose price is exogenous is an input into production, and an increase in its price will, in the long run, be partially passed on to the consumers. Second, a change in the exogenous price affects the level of real money balances and, hence, aggregate demand.
In the normal case in which D is smaller-than one, the adjustment of p is faster the larger is the component of the price level which is exogenous. When a large fraction of the prices are exogenous, changes in money balances or-in the exogenous prices exert large pressures on the endogenous prices leading them to adjust faster. Let the exogenous prices be described by where the roots of A(z) = 0 are larger than p in absolute value and the {'s are independent nor-ma1 variates with zero mean and variance a;.
T h e n , using the result of Hansen and Sar-gent (1980) that was referred to above and letting Z = DIGpc, one obtains:
F.quation (29) Four coefficients, namely, o,p, D , and c , enter the private sector's maximization problem. Unfortunately, we can only recover three ( y , 6, and Z ) nonlinear functions of these coefficients. In particular, w is not identified, and the response of the economy to a change i11 w cannot be simulated without additional information.
IV. Estimation and Testing of the Model Using Aggregate Data
T o estimate the aggregate model of Sections I1 and 111, it is fir-st necessary to decide which observal~le variables best represent the theoretical constructs m , p , and q. 7'0 focus on the cyclical fluctuations of output the presence of growth was neglected in the theoretical development. Therefore, the estimation is carried out with detrended variables whose mean has also been removed. I h e money stock that enters into the demand function (1) is assumed to be M1. T h e index of aggregate output Q is assumed to behave like GNP even though Q is supposed to include all the outputs of intermediate goods sections.
T h e price level is represented by the GDP deflatol-.4 T h e variable p,,, the index of the prices that are assumed to be exogenous, is a weighted aver-age of the prices of the sectors other than the private nonfarm business sector. T h e weights are given by the proportion of these sectors in total GDP. For the purpose of estimation, all variables are in natural logarithms as predicted by the theory."
Before the model is estimated, one question must be addressed. tVhat equation ought to be used both by the rational agents and by 'I hate ;ilso ehtimated the model using the consumer price index both unadjuhted and seasonallv ;idjusted. T h e latter led to rehults essentiall\ identical to those ohrained using the C;DP deflator. Instead, the uhe of seasonally una?juhted data produced much poorer re\ults, which suggests that the seasonality of prices is not due exclusi\~ely to the seasonality of mone) .
.A d;itd appendik including the derikation of the series actually used is available f-1-om the author upon request.
econometricians when forecasting rn and Po, the variables which ar-e not under the control of price-setting firms? Here it is postulated that the best forecasting equations are given by parsimonious univariate autor-egressions like (17) and (28). However, if the endogenous variables helped to predict m and PO,rational fir-ms would employ them for this purpose. Iher-efore, the following subsection is devoted to checking that, indeed, the endogenous var-iables d o not significantly help in predicting rn and 6,. T h e n it proceeds to present the parsimonious :tutoregressions which are taken to be the forecasting equations used by rational agents in the United States.
In the subsequent sections the model is estimated in two versions. Fir-st, in subsection C , all prices are assumed to be set by firms with loss function ( 5 ) . Second, in subsection D , only those fir-ms that produce nonfarm output are assumed to be exogenous. T h e estimates of these sections are the result of estimation via maximum likelihood. I h e DFP and M I N O P I algorithms were used to obtain convergence.
B. Thr Predzrtzon Of m nnd pO
This subsection begins by presenting evidence suggesting that the univariate representations (17) for-m and (28) for PO ar-e indeed appropriate descriptions of these series. These equations are, therefore, likely to he the equations used by fir-ms when forecasting m and
Po.
T h e fir-ms in this economy ar-e trying to predict the future values of m and Po using all available current information. Therefore, they Po. F-tests can then be computed to deter-mine whether these othervariables ar-e significant predictor-s of m and Po. These regressions and tests are presented in table 1. T h e null hypothesis of lack of causality can be accepted at the . i per-cent level if the reported F-statistic is below 2.29. Hence I can accept that m and 6,)are not caused by the other var-iables in the model.6
T h e fact that monev is not caused b\ but causes i~l c o~n e has been iliscussed 1n numerouh author, (Sims 1972; Feige and Pearce 1974; Sargent 1976n) . It must be noted that in a later paper Sims (1980) observed that interest rateh, ~vhich are ahsent from this analysih, d o appeal. to cause money.
This leads Ine to assume that the best forecasting equations for m and p, are the parsimonious representations of (17) and (28). I'hese are obtained using the methods suggested by Box and Jenkins (1970) .
T h e series rn can be parsimoniously represented by an XK(2) process of the first difference of m. In other ~vords, (17) becolnes7 T h e 0L.S estimates of equation (30) Finally, the process follolved by p, can also he represented parsimoniously as an XR(2). Equation (28), therefore, becomes
( 3 1) T h e OLS estimates of (31) Since a weighted average of relative prices which could be serially correlated and titne varying is assumed to he constant in order to derive the output equation (16), this equation might ivell be tnisspecified. -Iherefore, the estimation of (16) and (21) jointly could lead the tnisspecification of' the output equation to pollute the estimates of the para~neters of the price equation. This would be true whether one i~nposed the restrictions that the esti~nated A' s be the same in both equations or not. I'he model was thus estitnated in three versions. First, it ivas estimated without the output equation (specifications I and 11). T h e n it was fitted including the output equation and i~npos-ing the cross-equation restriction on the estimate of A (specification ' Note th;~t the p s are not equivalent to the T's of (17) slnce the former are coet&cient.; that :tppl\ to the fi~.st difference of m. I~z t e a d~t h e relationship hetkveen the 9 " s and the 9"s is given by 'PI = 1 + Y,, Y,= q2-q l ,and q:,= -%.
111). Finally, (16) and (21) lvere esti~nated jointly, but A,, the esti~nate of A from the price equation, was allowed to be different from A,, the esti~nate of A from the output equation (specification IV). This last specification might be appropriate if the technology parameter S , ivere not fixed. In this case the residuals of the output and price equations are not proportional to each other. Accepting the hypothesis that A, is equal to A, supports the view that the only shocks to the system are taste shocks. Instead, accepting the hypothesis ~vhich is embedded in specification I that A is zero suggests that most of the "cyclic" properties of y can be attributed to changes in the tnoney stock. T h e model also imposes three inequality restrictions on the parameters y, 6, and d, which for computational convenience 1vel.e not itnposed in the estimation. T h e roots y and 6 of the equation that ch, ., a1ncterizes prices must have the property that y < 1 while 6 > 1.
Further~nore, the coefficient d , which measures the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to tnoney balances, must be positive. These inequalities can, of course, be tested one hy one using the estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients.
T h e estimates o f t h e coefficients as ~vell as various test statistics are presented in table 2.
T h e IVah-asian equilibrium of this model ~vould he observed if y \\.ere equal to zero and 6 equal to infinity. This ~vould, of course, require that the only explanator of the price level be the contemporaneous level of money balances. Such a hypothesis is rejected by all the estimating equations, thereby lending credibility to the notion that prices are sticky in the United state^.^ Further~nore, the adjustment of prices is sho~vn to be very slo~v. This is evidenced by the high values of 7, the coefficient of lagged prices in the price equation.
This slowness is due to one of t~v o causes: Either the effect of real money balances on demand is small enough to cause the penalties that accrue f r o~n charging the lvrong prices to be ~ninimal, or the suhjective costs of charging prices are high. I h i s can he seen hy computing the underlying behavioral parameters p and Dlc frotn (13) and (14).
Using specification 11, the preferred specification, the estimated value of Dlc (0.08) is indeed very low as required for prices to move slo~vly.~ for two reasons: First, it is This specification is preferred "n a seme t h~s test could overstate the importance of sticky prices since it forces the \V;~l~.,is~>tn equilihriurn to be a static model. Instead in the presence of costs of adjusting the c'~pital stock of the sort discussed by Lucas and Prescott (1971) , the competitive equilil~riurn \\.ill have dynamic features. However, insofar as the model of this paper is not rejected by less constrained specifications, it is reasonable to test the implications of forcing all pricea to adjust instantaneouslv.
T h e implied estimates of p are somewhat small (on the 01-der of 0.002). This low \,ilue fol-p is the reflection of the rather large coefficient estimates of 6. These ensure h < )~t .
-5rdnd'ir~l error, a r c tn p.+rcnrhrrc* I'hr nurnhcrr In t,r.ickctr nrr t h r numbers 01 reirric rlc,nr re*trd .tnd .Irr thur cqu.tl ro rhc nurnhcr ,,I degrcrs <,ffrccdorn of rhr rclc\.int xZ d t r t r~b u r~o n , A n ;irrerlrk rne.tnr th.+t t h r \.+lue rhr \r.+rl\rli I \ Ioi+rr th.+n rhr \clue 10 t h r let1 of i . h~c h lie, !I9 percent of rhc relc\.tnt X' dt\r~tljution superiol to specification I since A is significantly different from zero, ivhich thus suggests that rnoney is not the only determinant of the fluctuations of real money balances and output. Second, the output equation does appear to be rnisspecified, a n d therefore its separate estimation is warranted. I'he first sign of this rnisspecification is that that expected future money balances are not important determinants of cur~.ent prices. Instead, only curt-ent rnonev b:il,inces appear to be important in this respect. I n turn, thih suggest\ that firms are not overly concerned by the future and that they have a high diqcount I-ate. the D-\l' statistic corresponding to the output equation is quite lo~v. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the estimate of A from the price equation A, is the same as the corresponding estimate for the output equation A, is rejected as can be seen by comparing the /-statistics corresponding to specifications I11 and IV. That the potential ~nisspecification of the output equation affects the joint estimates of' the system can be seen by noting that the estimates for 6 are below unity ~v h e n the output equation is included. This runs counter to the model's prediction that the "unstable" 1.oot 6 is larger th;in unity. S o t e that when the output equation is excluded, the estimates for 6 are always larger than one.
I now proceed to test these regressions against alternative hypotheses which impose less structure on the data. These less restricted specifications could arise either if' the model of firm behavior was true and the expectations were not computed r.ationally or if the expectations ~vel-e computed rationally but firms chose their prices by pursuing different objectives.
T h e models estimated in table 2 have many more explanatory \-ariahles than coefficients. I h e pricing equation in the first column has fi)ur explanatory variables (lagged prices, current, and t~v o lags of money), while the money fhrecasting equation has two explanatory \,ariables. However, only foul coefficients are estimated (y, 6 , T , ,and -q 2 ) . rllerefore, the model imposes two nonlineal restrictions on the coefficients of' six explanatory variables. It is natul.al to test these cross-equation restrictions by comparing each specification to a specific:ition that uses the same explanatory variables but does not restrict the coefficients. T h e logarithm of the determinant of the covariance matrix of the errors of these unrestricted regressions is I,. T h e tests are carried out by computing the quantities T(1, -I) and contrasting them \t-ith the X ' distribution with r degrees of freedom.
Here r is the difference in the number of coefficients used in the computations of' I , and the number of coefficients used in the cornputation of I. ;Is can be seen in table 2, the unrestricted estimates do not reject the model.
Next, the fit of those specifications ~vhich include the output equation is compared with the fit of an even less restricted model ~vhich allo~vs output to be explained by two lags of output as ~vell as by the current and lagged real money balances. This was done because the output equation may well be misspecified by the exclusion of a serially correlated variable. T h e logarithm of the determinant of the covariance of the errors from estimating this more unrestricted model is I,. Indeed, the hypothesis that each explanatory variable has its own coefficient and that output is explained by two lags and current and lagged real money balances rejects the model when the output equation is estimated jointly ~vith the other equations. This represents further evidence that the output equation is rnisspecified.
Finally, I contrast the system composed of ( 1 6 ) ,( 1 8), ( 2 l ) , and (30) ~\.ithan extl-e~nely unconstl-ained nod el, namely, a fourth-ordel-vector autoregl-ession. T h e purpose of this comparison is to allolv the nod el to be rejected by models tvhich, while theoretically eclectic, appear to fit the data very \\-ell. T h e vector autol-egression is estimated using ordinary least squares as suggested by Silns (1980) .T h e test of the model as a set of I-estrictions o n the vectol-autoregression is given by the statistic T (1, -I) . T h e vel-sions of the model in I\-hich the output equation is excluded are not rejected by the vectol-autol-egressions. Instead, as ~vould be expected after comparing I , ~vithI, ~v h e n the output equation is included, the vector autoregression I\-ith four lags rejects the model I\-ith 99 percent confidence. This section leads to t~v o main conclusions. First, prices do appear to be sticky in the United States. Second, the restrictions on the paths o f the price level and money balances implied by the model are not rejected by U.S. data.
I n this subsection, I,, the deflator for the product of the business nonfarm sector, is assu~ned to be the result of prices charged by monopolies ~vhich face costs of price adjustment. T h e rest of the prices are assumed to be exogenous and follo~v (31) .T h e model as it ~v i l lbe estimated thus includes equations ( 1 6 ) , (18) , ( 2 9 ) , (30), and ( 31 ) .
Before proceeding with this estimation, however, one must determine ~v h ;~t the appropriate variable for fit is in the output equation
(16).
T h e GDP deflator cannot be I\-ritten as in ( 2 2 ) for any fixed w since the proportion of CDP accounted for by the business nonfarm sector has been increasing steadily in the post~val-period. If the "corl-ect" deflatol-of money balances is the GDP deflator, the estimation of ( 1 6 )is stl-aightfol-~val-d I\-hile the pricing equation ( 2 9 ) ,I\-hich is derived from ( 2 2 ) ,is subject to errors of measul-ement. If instead the "correct" deflator satisfies (22) for some w , the pricing equation is correctly specified and the relevant output equation is:
This equation identifies the ~veight w . Six vel-sions of the model ~vel-e therefore fitted to U.S. data. Since the output equation Inay be ~nisspecified, it was fitted separately in specifications I and 11 to avoid the potential pollution of the estimated pal-ameters of the other equations. Specification I explores the effects of forcing A to be zero, I\-hile specification I1 relaxes this constraint. Specifications I11 and IV use the GDP deflator as the price index ~vhich households take into account ~v h e n computing their real money balances. Instead, specifications V and VI force that price index to be ;I convex combination ofp, and p,as in (22) and (32). While specifications I11 and V force the estimate of A to be the same acl-oss the price and output equations, specifications IV and VI relax this requirement on the grounds that the technology pal-ametel-may be time varying. Table 3 presents both the estimates col-responding to the various versions of the ~v o d e l and the statistics that can be used to judge their acceptability. For all the versions, the estimates satisfy those inequality I-estrictions I\-hich the model implies but which were not imposed during the estimation. In particular, y is positive and smaller than one, 6 is greatel-than one, and Z and d are positive. T h e hypothesis that there are no costs to changing prices is rejected. Moreover, prices are very "sticky" and adjust slo~t-ly as evidenced by the high values of y. These are caused either by a small effect of real money balances on demand (low D ) or by high costs of changing prices, c. Indeed, the point estimates of Dlc are around 0.2.1°
Once again the pal-anletel-A is significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the pal-ametel-A is the same in both the price and output equations is not rejected in either of the specifications of the output equation. These facts lend credence to the notion that changes in tastes are important determinants of the cyclic movements of output.
T h e output equations continue to sho~t-syrnptoms of misspecification. Both of its versions have low D-W statistics. All versions of the model ~vhich include the output equations are rejected by models ~vhich d o not constrain the coefficients and have a second lag of output as an explanator of output. They are also rejected by fourthorder vector auiol-egressions, as the high values of T(1, -I ) for specifications 11 1 through V1 indicate.
Another unfortunate feature of the output equation is that ~v h e n (32) is fitted jointly bvith the other equations, it leads to an estimate for w which has the wrong sign and a large standard el-1.01-. However, this estimate is not significantly different from the rather reasonable one obtained by fitting the output equation separately, as can be seen from the following regression: (.036) lo T h e estimates fol-the discount kictot-ar-e, once again, sume~vhat small (al-ound0.3).
LYhile the output equation appeal-s to be misspecified, the opposite is true for the equation describing the price level. Specification 11, ~vhich includes the output equation tvhile allo\\-ing zlf to follow a first-order autoregression, not only is not rejected by a model I\-hich includes the same exp!anatory variables without constraining their coefficients but is also accepted at the 99.2 percent significance level against a vector autoregression.
T h e results for this case are thus mixed. On the favorable side, the coefficients satisfy the model's restl-ictions, and the specification of the pricing equation is basically not rejected by less restrictive hypotheses. Furthermore, the hypothesis that prices are fully flexible is I-ejected. On the other hand, the output equation appears to be misspecified, and the construction of a price index that reflects the postulates of the model has probably not been achieved.
V. Conclusions
This paper presents evidence related to a specific model of sticky prices. I n this model, prices are sticky because firms face a subjective cost to changing their prices. They are sticky in the sense that they are closer to those prices Ivhich prevailed the period before than they ~vould be if no agent's decisions at t depended on prices at t -I . T h e model incorporates a number of specific assumptions about the functional forms of the demand functions, production functions, etc. It therefore significantly reduces the set of outconles that d o not contradict it.
I estimate the equilibrium paths of the price level and output implied by the model. These equilibrium paths must satisfy t~v o types of testable restrictions. First, the estimated parameters must satisfy certain inequalities. Second, the model predicts that if one Ivere to estimate more parameters by adding explanatory variables, these added variables would not significantly contribute to the explanation of the price level and output. T h e estimation of this aggregate model was cal-ried out both under the assumption that all prices are set by firms that face a subjective cost to changing prices and under the assumption that some prices are exogenous. 'Fhe latter assumption produced results that are slightly more consistent ~vith the nod el. In general, the estimated parameters satisfy the restrictions imposed by the model. Furthermol-e, ~v h e n the output equation is excluded, less restricted models do not reject the model of this paper. Finally, the hypothesis that prices adjust instantaneously, under the maintained hypothesis about the functional forms of the demand and production functions, is rejected by the data. These three facts are taken to be evidence that the rnodel ought to be taken ser-iously as an explanator of aggregate phenornena in the United States.
On the other hand, the output equation appears to be misspecified, since when it is included the model is rejected by some of the models that are less I-estr-icted. This might be due to the neglect of the costs which are associated with changing output.
Since this model does notjust make predictions about the stochastic processes followed by the aggr-egate variables, but instead starts by making predictions about individual prices and quantities, it would be desirable to estirnate and test this rnodel using microeconomic data. In particular, the ideal pr-ocedur-e would be to estimate jointly the equilibrium (represented by the nlovernent of the aggregate variables) and the objective functions of individual firms (represented by the movement of firm-specific var-iables).
L-ess ambitious undertakings would include the estimation of the effect on the aggr-egate variables of both particular exogenous prices and shifts in the labor supply curve. T h e former-could be achieved by disaggr-egating the consumer-price index, the latter by estimating jointly a labor supply curve.
